1. Quick summary

On August 26, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, through OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control – the authority responsible for managing and enforcing economic and financial sanctions) sanctioned Autistici/Inventati (A/I), an Italian collective that has been providing digital infrastructure – email, hosting, mailing lists, chat, videoconferencing, streaming, and services related to privacy and anonymity – to movements and activists since 2001. Washington designated it as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), alleging that it has provided financial, material or technological support to terrorism and to organizations already subjected to sanctions. A/I rejects the allegations and declares that its activities consist in providing tools for digital self-defence and infrastructure for the freedom of communication.

On August 28 the autistici.org web domain was found to be unreachable. The collective attributed the problem to the DNS level and to the .org domain registry, Public Interest Registry (PIR). This technical point is important: it does not necessarily mean that the server was shut down; a domain can be made unreachable by preventing the normal DNS publication or resolution. Technical findings indicated a serverHold status for the domain (see below, “10. The blocking of autistici.org: facts and attributions”). The exact cause and the formal chain of decision-making must be however distinguished from the collective’s inferences: there is no public statement from PIR explicitly saying that it acted on OFAC’s orders.

2. Who is Autistici/Inventati

Autistici/Inventati was born in Italy in March 2001 from the meeting of individuals and collectives active in the fields of technology, privacy, digital rights and political activism. The collective offers free infrastructure as an alternative to large commercial platforms. A/I presents itself as an anti-fascist, anti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-militarist organization, opposed to capitalism and to authoritarianism, and selects the projects it hosts based on their compatibility with these principles.

The infrastructure is managed through a formally recognised association. This means that A/I is not an informal group: its activities are run by an association complying with all existing legal regulations, with legal responsibilities, contractual relationships and the associated obligations and controls.

This does not mean that the association has never had to deal with the justice system. Over the years there have been proceedings and interventions by the authorities, also on an international scale. Among the episodes recalled by the collective are the 2004-2005 intervention on the servers hosted by Aruba, in the context of an investigation launched by the public prosecutor’s office in Bologna, as well as subsequent disputes concerning individual pieces of content or accounts. In another case, following a suit by Trenitalia concerning a satirical site, the court of Milan ruled in defense of satire.

3. What the United States has decided

On August 26, OFAC placed Autistici/Inventati on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List with the SDGT designation. The legal basis is Executive Order 13224, issued in 2001 and subsequently amended, which allows for action to be taken against those who, in the view of the US administration, provide material, financial or technological support to terrorist activities.

The SDGT designation should not be confused with the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) category. It is primarily a sanctions designation: assets and property interests subject to the US jurisdiction are frozen, and US citizens are generally prohibited from conducting transactions with the designated entity, subject to OFAC authorization.

4. What Washington accuses A/I of

According to the US Treasury, A/I provides digital infrastructure, tools and services to “violent Antifa cells” and other left-wing extremists. The statement cites hosting, encrypted email, chat and videoconferencing, streaming, and the infrastructure associated with Noblogs. Washington also claims that the infrastructure was made available to organizations already subjected to sanctions, specifically naming the PKK.

The logic behind this accusation is therefore not simply “A/I carried out a terrorist attack”. The point is so-called material support: according to Washington, the technological infrastructure constitutes a means of supporting individuals or activities qualified as terrorist.

The point at issue is therefore less straightforward than the phrase “has carried out terrorist acts” suggests: the charge concerns the role of the infrastructure and of the services provided to users. In this perspective, the question becomes to what extent the provision of technological services — email, hosting, chat, streaming or other communication tools — can be considered material support to a subject qualified as terrorist.

OFAC further maintains that the sanctions do not target the mere protected political expression, but rather support for conduct falling within the definition of terrorism in Executive Order 13224.

5. The collective’s response

A/I firmly rejects the US qualification. The collective describes itself as composed of volunteers and digital activists, saying that it merely provides digital self-defence tools for activists, individuals, groups and associations.

6. OFAC in a nutshell

The SDN List is the list of designated entities. In A/I’s case the acronym SDGT stands for Specially Designated Global Terrorist: it is a US sanctions designation, distinct from the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) category, but with concrete economic consequences. The OFAC entry file on A/I also includes the notation “Secondary sanctions risk”.

The strength of this system does not stem solely from the fact that the United States can block assets within the US. The influence of the financial system, the US dollar and US companies can produce indirect effects abroad as well: banks, platforms and providers may sever ties to avoid compliance risk. This phenomenon is often called de-risking.

7. Why the sanction may have effects outside the US

The US designation does not automatically amount to a ban on A/I in Italy or the European Union. The US, the EU and individual states have distinct legal systems and counter-terrorism lists. Inclusion on the OFAC list does however produce significant pressure on operators dealing with the designated entity.

OFAC has also issued General License 36, which authorises the wind-down of certain transactions involving A/I within September 25, 2026. In this context, the term “wind-down” refers to the possibility of closing or bringing pre-existing relationships and transactions with the sanctioned entity to an orderly conclusion within a timeframe set by OFAC. It is therefore not an authorisation to maintain relationships indefinitely, but rather a deadline. It is important to distinguish between the period granted for the wind-down, any applicable legal obligations, and the independent decisions of operators who choose to sever the relationship earlier.

8. August 28: what happened to the DNS

When a user types autistici.org in their browser, the computer needs to know which IP address it should connect to. The DNS (Domain Name System) performs this function: it translates a human-readable name, such as autistici.org, into the server’s numerical address.

Simplified diagram: user → DNS → IP address → server → website.

If the DNS stops returning the correct match, the server may remain active but the website becomes unreachable for the users of that domain.

It is therefore important not to mix up the act of “disconnecting or suspending the domain” with the decision to “shut down the server”. The former action affects a different level of the hosting infrastructure.

9. ICANN, PIR, registrars and servers: who does what

• ICANN coordinates the domain name system globally and signs agreements with the registries of the various Top-Level Domains (TLDs), in this case “.org”.
• PIR (Public Interest Registry) is the registry operator of the .org domain: it manages the .org name registry and a key part of the TLD’s DNS infrastructure.
• The registrar is the intermediary through which the individual domain is registered and administered.
• The provider/host manages the servers on which websites and services are actually hosted.
• A/I is the party that uses the domain and manages its own services and infrastructure.

Diagram: ICANN → coordinates the system; PIR → manages .org; registrar → administers domain registration; servers/hosting → host the content. For this reason, PIR should not be described as the provider that “hosts” A/I’s website.

10. The blocking of autistici.org: facts and attributions

Technical findings have indicated that the domain is in serverHold status, a status that normally prevents the the domain from being published in the DNS. The technical data documents the status of the domain, but does not in itself prove who decided to take this action or for what reason.

The domain was rendered unresolvable and A/I believes that this action can be attributed to PIR. There is currently no public statement from PIR specifically explaining the case or confirming that the action was carried out on OFAC’s direct order.

11. Why the DNS is the most important point in this story

This incident shows that digital infrastructure can be targeted at different levels. It is not necessary to seize the server containing specific data: action can be taken against the domain name that allows it to be found. In this sense the domain name becomes a point of control.

The central question therefore becomes: what happens when an Italian collective, its servers and its users are formally located outside the US jurisdiction but use a .org domain managed by a US registry and financial or technological services linked to the US market?

12. Banca Etica: the sanction also affected an Italian bank account

The consequences of the US designation do not only affect the internet. According to Autistici/Inventati’s own account and as reported by media outlets, Banca Etica has informed the collective that it is planning to close their account following A/I’s placement on the OFAC list. This is a significant development because it shows how a decision taken by a US authority can produce concrete consequences even in the financial dealings of an Italian organization.

It is important, however, not to read this situation as a consequence of a direct order to close the account sent by the US Government to Banca Etica. What is happening is more complex. Inclusion on the OFAC list subjects the sanctioned party to a set of restrictions and, in Autistici/Inventati’s case, the US measure also signals a risk of secondary sanctions. For a bank or another financial intermediary, this can translate into a compliance issue: continuing to maintain relationships with the sanctioned party may be considered too risky from a legal, financial or reputational point of view.

This is known as de-risking: an intermediary may choose to terminate a relationship not necessarily because an Italian regulation automatically requires it to do so, but because it wants to avoid exposure to the risks arising from the US sanctions system. In this sense, an OFAC sanction can produce effects far beyond the US jurisdiction without the need for a direct order addressed to the individual bank.

The case is particularly interesting because it concerns Banca Etica, an institution that has made responsible finance and a commitment to to human rights an important part of its identity and which has already criticised the extraterritorial impact of US sanctions, including when such measures were taken against UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese. The A/I case therefore shows a potential tension between two imperatives: on the one hand, the bank’s principles and public stances; on the other, the obligations, risks and compliance assessments connected to managing a relationship with a party placed on the OFAC lists.

Here too it is therefore useful to distinguish between US sanction and Italian consequences. Washington has designated A/I; the decision to terminate the banking relationship, if confirmed, is however a decision by the Italian intermediary. It is precisely this chain — OFAC → designation → compliance risk → intermediary → possible termination of the relationship — that shows to which extent US financial sanctions can have indirect effects even on entities located outside the United States.

The overall picture is therefore one of a potential domino effect leading to the disruption of various services: web infrastructure, domain names, email and financial tools. It is precisely this proliferation of points of dependency that seta this incident apart from the simple censorship of a web page.

13. The broader issue: when infrastructure becomes support

This case is interesting because it shifts the focus from the responsibility of those carrying out an action to the responsibility of those providing the infrastructure that enables communication, organisation or the publication of content.

The question does not concern only A/I. The same principle could, in theory, apply to email providers, cloud services, hosting providers, messaging platforms, payment systems or domain registrars. The point is establishing when the provision of a general-purpose service becomes, under the applicable laws, “material support” to a terrorist organization.

14. Timeline

August 26, 2026 — OFAC sanctions A/I as SDGT under Executive Order 13224.

August 26, 2026 — OFAC issues General License 36, authorizing the wind-down of certain operations with A/I within September 25.

August 27, 2026 — The Italian press reconstructs the designation and the collective’s response.

August 28, 2026 — Autistici.org is found unreachable; A/I attributes the problem to the DNS and points to PIR as the point of intervention.

15. What we know / what we don’t know

We know: A/I was placed on the OFAC SDN list with the SDGT designation on August 26.

We know: Washington has accused A/I of providing infrastructure and digital services to violent extremists and to sanctioned terrorist subjects.

We know: A/I rejects the accusations and claims its role consists in providing infrastructure for communication, privacy and digital self-defence.

We know: On August 28, the autistici.org domain had a resolution/accessibility problem and the domain was detected in serverHold status.

Reconstruction: A/I attributes the intervention to the .org registry, PIR.

Not yet established: That PIR acted on OFAC’s direct order.

Not yet established: That ICANN ordered or authorized the suspension.

Not yet established: The precise chain of decision-making linking the OFAC designation to the blockage

Not yet established: That the closure of the banking relationship was directly ordered by the United States.

Not yet established: That Banca Etica is legally compelled by the US sanctions to close the relationship.

We know: A/I’s OFAC entry file also carries the indication ‘Secondary sanctions risk’.

16. Starting sources and primary sources

• U.S. Department of the Treasury, 26 agosto 2026: ‘Treasury Takes Action Against Violent Far-Left Terrorist Networks’.
• OFAC, Recent Actions / SDN designation, 26 agosto 2026.
• OFAC, General License 36, 26 agosto 2026.
• ICANN, Registry Agreement per .org.
• Public Interest Registry (PIR), documentazione sul ruolo e la sicurezza del registry .org.
• Autistici/Inventati, materials on the collective and its services.
• New York Times, reconstruction of the US crackdown on the far left.
• RaiNews American sanctions on Italian collective “Autistici/Inventati” are a danger for the whole Internet: includes declaration by EFF.

Source: https://www.inventati.org/campaign/press

passiert am 28.08.2026